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BOOK REVIEWS
REVIEW ARTICLE
PUNISHMENT: THE CONTROVERSY GOES ON*
JACK P. GIBBS**
During this century numerous criminologists and in the grave. Van den Haag offers no novel defense of
psychiatrists have asserted that legal punishments retribution, and it is difficult to imagine one.
neither deter nor further any defensible end of
Defending the retributive doctrine is like playing
criminal justice. That assertion is the prime target of cymbals; you can make loud noises but the variety is
Ernest van den Haag's Punishing Criminals: limited. Having declared that criminals should be
Concerning a Very Old and Painful Question. The punished because they deserve it, the retributivist's
book is primarily a philosophical analysis of punishargument essentially ends.
ment, but criminologists with a scientific bent should
True, more can be said, but the retributivist
not be put off by that loose characterization. Van den quickly runs into troublesome questions. Granted
Haag's work serves to remind us that several issues that criminals should suffer pain, what is the
pertaining to punishment are beyond science. Karl
appropriate punishment? Van den Haag confronts
Menninger notwithstanding, ' there are no rules of the question (p. 191), but it survives his book. He
logic by which a scientific finding implies or entails a
recognizes the ancient maxim that the punishment
particular penal policy.
should be proportionate to the "gravity" of the offense, and yet he admits that the maxim does not
really answer the question. "Gravity" can be asRETRIBUTION RESURRECTED
For decades the debate over penal policy has
centered on "rehabilitation versus deterrence;"
hence, van den Haag's argument for retributive
punishment enlarges the debate. However, the retributive rationale for legal punishments is now commonly viewed as a barbaric anachronism, one that
only a redneck is still willing to entertain. That view
of retribution is grotesque unless one is prepared to
believe that Kant and Hegel were stupid or insensitive brutes. In any case, van den Haag has sought to
breathe new life into an idea long since discarded by
2
social scientists but not by philosophers.
A failure in resurrection. The dilemma in resurrecting an old idea is that related issues rarely remain
*

A review of PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A

VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION. By Ernest van den

Haag. New York: Basic Books. 1975. Pp. 283. $11.50.
** University of Arizona.
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For a more extensive critical commentary, see
PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 197-210 (J. Murphy
ed. 2 1973).
See, e.g., PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISH-

MENT (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972); THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
(S. Grupp ed. 1971).

sessed in terms of evaluation by the public of the
seriousness of a type of crime, and van den Haag
briefly considers (p. 192) related lines of research
(e.g., Wolfgang), only to turn away from that approach on the ground that such seriousness measures are somehow imprecise. Yet no degree of precision would answer the question that given a
seriousness measure for a type of crime, how does
one deduce the appropriate severity of the punishment? The question is all the more difficult because
severity is not an objective property of a punishment. So like retributivists before him, van den
Haag is stumped by the "appropriate punishment"
question; to his credit he hardly pretends otherwise. Nonetheless, the retributive doctrine is not
furthered by citing (p. 194) Hegel's admission that
reason cannot determine appropriate punishments.
Still another problem for retributivists haunts van
den Haag's work. It commences with his attempt to
clarify the notion of retribution itself. Explicit
definitions are not van den Haag's forte, and so he is
content to create the impression that retribution has
something to do with criminals receiving their desert
and with the vindication of the legal order. Throughoutovan den Haag's conceptualizations, his partial
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definitions of retribution take on a metaphysical
quality. Desert, vindication, and related notions are
alluded to as though they transcend the perception
and sentiments of participants in the penal system.
Consider, for example, his statement (p. 11) that
"[r]etribution
is
to restore an
objective
order rather than to satisfy a subjective craving for
revenge." Should capital punishment be effectively
restored in the United States, inscribing the first
seven words of the statement over the doorway to the
execution chamber might be a charitable act.
Van den Haag could have resorted to a more
"earthy" and explicit definition, such as, "A punishment is retributive if and only if those who prescribe
or administer it do so solely because they believe that
the objects of the punishment deserve it." Yet
retributivists understandably shy away ffom such a
definition in order to avoid troublesome questions.
Why make the normative beliefs of legislators the
standard of retribution? Here we see the advantage of
appealing to such notions as desert and vindication;
those notions avoid recognition of normative dissensus, social conflict, and the political character of
criminal law. Yet is is surely difficult to take those
phenomena seriously and then accept van den Haag's
pronouncement (p. 9) that "[clonduct prohibited
by law is wrong.... " Moreover, although van den
Haag strives valiantly to square the retributive doctrine with the awful implications of poverty, grossly
unequal opportunities, and ghettos, his efforts resemble a zoo keeper's justification of the confinement of leopards. Nonetheless, it is much to van den
Haag's credit that he confronts the problem of reconciling retributive justice and distributive justice.
Since a defensible conceptualization of retribution
had eluded generations of philosophers, it is surprising that van den Haag devoted so little attention to
the problem. No less important, he does not speak
directly to the question of why it is that the
retributive doctrine no longer has a large and
respected following. Perhaps we shall never know,
but the nearly complete demise of the doctrine may
reflect the continuing shift from mechanical to
organic solidarity, with a concomitant decrease in the
collective intensity of normative beliefs, including
those manifested in criminal law. 3 Demonstration of
such an evolutionary trend would cast doubt on the
feasibility of efforts to restore the retributive doctrine; one may as well plead for reversion to
animism.
'See
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Whereas numerous philosophers regard the retributive doctrine and the deterrence doctrine as incompatible, van den Haag calls for a penal policy
based on both. The compatibility of the two doctrines is debatable, but in any case the central issues are distinct. As already suggested, the retributive doctrine is not an empirical theory, whereas
the deterrence doctrine is little more than an empirical theory, though one that has never been
stated systematically. Hence, the notion of evidence
is central in assessing the deterrence doctrine.
Evidence of deterrence. Critics of the deterrence
doctrine are likely to regard van den Haag's survey of
relevant research findings as biased, for the survey is
limited primarily to recent research findings, most of
which purportedly support the deterrence doctrine.
However, in fairness to van den Haag, it should be
recognized that there were few systematic studies of
deterrence prior to 1965, and those studies were
largely limited to the relation between homicide rates
and the statutory death penalty. Nonetheless, van den
Haag pays scant attention to the findings that bear on
specific deterrence, and those findings are especially
strategic in the current policy debate.
Even though the recent renewal of research on
deterrence has generated findings that appear to
support the doctrine, that is the case only for
propositions about general deterrence, and by any
reasonable standard there is precious little evidence
of specific deterrence (a conventional notion that van
den Haag does not recognize). The point is important because van den Haag emphatically joins a
growing number of criminologists who question the
efficacy of rehabilitative programs in criminal corrections." Doubts along that line are surely justified,
but van den Haag goes beyond doubts and advocates
an alter-native. His message can best be put as a
rhetorical question, "Why continue futile efforts at
rehabilitation when research findings indicate that
deterrence is an effective alternative?" The question
ignores the point that the alternative to rehabilitation programs is a penal policy that promotes specific deterrence, and it is precisely that component
of the deterrence doctrine which remains the most
dubious.
It is conceivable that the crime rate could be
reduced through general deterrence rather than
'E.g., Martinson, What Works?- Questions and
Answers About Prison Return, 35 PUBLIC INTEREST 22
(1974); G. KASSEBAUM, et aL, PRISON TREATMENT AND
PAROLE. SURVIVAL: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT (1971).
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through reduction of recidivism, but what of further
efforts at rehabilitation? If a critic of current penal
policy truly proposes an exclusive concern with
general deterrence and retribution, then he or she
should say with regard to potential recidivists,
"Lock them up and forget them." That admonition
would be shocking but honest, and more candor in
the debate over penal policy is needed no less than
more research. One small step toward candor would
be strictly linguistic: renewing use of the terms
"penal" and "penitentiary." Surely those terms are
more realistic than "criminal correction program"
and "rehabilitation center."
Critics who dismiss van den Haag's survey of
evidence as biased will miss the point. The major
shortcoming of the survey is a seeming insensitivity to
the specific reasons for inconclusive evidence. In
reporting research on the relation between properties
of legal punishments and crime rates, sociologists and
economists have gone too far in alluding to their
work as a test of the deterrence doctrine. This is
especially the case when the research focuses on
objective properties of punishment (e.g., admissions
to prison as a ratio to crimes reported) rather than
perceptual properties (e.g., estimates by the public of
the certainty of imprisonment). Unfortunately, virtually all "deterrence research" has focused on objective properties of punishment; demonstration of even
a close relation between objective properties and
crime rates would be dubious evidence of deterrence.
Such a relation could reflect any one or various
combinations of nine preventive mechanisms other
than deterrence.' Van den Haag recognizes only
some of those mechanisms (e.g., incapacitation,
stigmatization), and he speaks of "indirect effects" of
punishment without emphasizing that his argument
has shifted from deterrence to the general prevention
of crime through punishment. Rather than recognize
that conventional distinction, van den Haag defines
(p. 62) deterrence as "the restraining effect the punishment of criminals has on others." That conceptualization makes deterrence a sponge concept and
completely ignores specific deterrence.
The distinction between deterrence and other
preventive mechanisms of punishment should be
maintained when debating penal policy because
legislators are singularly attracted to one deterrence
proposition-that an increase in the presumptive
severity of statutory penalties will be followed by a
decline in the crime rate. A simpler and less costly
solution of the "crime problem" could not be
'J.

(1975).

GIBBS,

CRIME,

PUNISHMENT,

AND

DETERRENCE

[Vol. 67

imagined; but, confronted with the possibility that
long prison sentences reduce the crime rate only
through incapacitation (if at all), legislators will have
second thoughts about the pursuit of law and order.
Unless one is prepared to advocate only solitude and
hard labor for convicts, then the cost of preventing
crime through imprisonment and incapacitation
would be staggering.
Van den Haag's survey of findings ignores the
point that for all practical purposes deterrence
research has considered only three of nine possibly
relevant properties of punishment. 6 The exclusion of
perceptual properties is particularly unfortunate,
since the deterrence doctrine is first and foremost a
perceptual theory (insofar as it is a theory at all).
The limited range of deterrence research has more
than scientific implications. One can interpret the
deterrence doctrine as comprising several propositions, each pertaining to the relation between a
particular property of punishment and some kind of
crime rate. The crucial point for penal policy is that
the empirical validity of any one of those propositions
is logically independent from that of the other
propositions. Hence, legislators should never be
confronted by scholars with the declaration that
evidence supports the deterrence doctrine. Since the
doctrine comprises several independent propositions,
legislators could construe the declaration as a
rationale for increasing the presumptive severity of
statutory penalties. But the evidence in question may
not even pertain to that property of punishment.
Loose designations of properties of punishment
will not suffice, and that point is important in
contemplating van den Haag's reference (p. 214) to
the "known general relationship between severity
and deterrence." That reference ignores a major
feature of recent findings that while there may be a
relation between crime rates and the objective certainty of imprisonment, there is little evidence of a
relation between the presumptive severity (length) of
actual prison sentences and crime rates. Moreover,
what "severity" does van den Haag have in mind? Is
it the perceived severity of statutory penalties, the
perceived severity of actual punishments, the pre-

sumptive severity of actual punishments, or the
presumptive severity of statutory penalties?

Let us hope that legislators do not construe van
den Haag as referring to the presumptive severity of
statutory penalties; this is a property that legislators
are prone to manipulate if only because it is the only
property they can manipulate readily. That property
has been ignored in the recent renewal of deterrence
6Id.
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research, largely as a reaction against the preoccupation of earlier investigators with the statutory death
penalty. In that connection, van den Haag admits
(p. 216) that the earlier investigators did not find that
crime rates change consistently with abolition or
reinstatement of the death penalty. In fact, the
homicide rates of abolition states were by no means
greater than those of capital states. However, subsequently he suggests that those negative findings can
be attributed to the crude methodology of the early
research. Hence, insofar as his argument for the
deterrent efficacy of the death penalty rests on
systematic empirical evidence, it rests only on his
reference (p. 217) to Ehrlich's recent study. One
investigation is a thin reed for an argument; all the
more so in this case since Ehrlich's investigation did
not deal with the perceived certainty of execution,
which is central in assessing the deterrent efficacy of
the death penalty. No less important, legislators are
now largely concerned with some kind of statutory
reinstatement of the death penalty, and viewed
strictly in that context the findings of earlier investigations are more relevant than those of Ehrlich.
Van den Haag's survey of evidence suffers primarily because he simply does not recognize that the
deterrence doctrine is a far cry from a systematic
theory. In attempting to restate it as a theory, one is
virtually forced to recognize the variety of possibly
relevant properties of punishment and the evidential
problems posed by preventive mechanisms other than
deterrence. Moreover, once the doctrine is restated as
a systematic theory, its bearing on penal policy will
be relative to particular component propositions of
the theory. But van den Haag, along with economists,' presumes that the concepts and principles
of classical economics are sufficient to state the deterrence doctrine. He theorizes (p. 217) that
"[cihanges in costs (penalties) are as likely to
influence the supply of crime-including murderas they are to influence the supply of anything
else." Are we to believe that all of the various possibly relevant properties of punishment can be subsumed under the notion of cost? If so, how? Even
if subsumable, are all of the properties therefore
equally relevant? What defensible assumptions
about perceptions of punishment can be deduced
from the principles of economics? In what sense can
incapacitation, normative validation, and normative insulation be regarded as "economic choices"
by prospective offenders? Van den Haag and economists who have engaged in deterrence research ap7

E.g., Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime? 36

PUBLIC INTEREST

103 (1974).

pear indifferent to such questions; surely they are
not answered by unlimbering the heavy artillery of
econometrics. Like their counterparts in sociology,
econometricians evidently believe that statistical
techniques are substitutes for substantive theory.
The foregoing is unfair to van den Haag in that he
is clearly sensitive to certain issues in assessments of
the deterrence doctrine. He points out how sociologists and psychiatrists have grossly over-generalized
their criticisms of the deterrence doctrine, quoting (p.
133) among others Lawrence Kubie: "We know it
is a fantasy that punishment deters others." Even
more salient is van den Haag's forcible rejection of
the claim that the deterrence doctrine is invalid
because it (1) assumes that human behavior is
rational8 and (2) ignores the "sickness" of criminals.
As might be expected of someone who has taught
social philosophy in addition to being a psychoanalyst, noted social critic, and a Lecturer in
Sociology and Psychology, van den Haag is at his
best in dealing with the non sequiturs of critics of the
deterrence doctrine.
The slighting of a major issue. Given van den
Haag's philosophical stance, it is surprising that he
pays so little attention (pp. 28-29) to what is perhaps
the primary ethical objection to the deterrence
doctrine; that is, that it justifies or is conducive to
the punishment of the innocent. In discussing
retribution, he indicates that "wrongful imprisonment" is not punishment, thereby suggesting that it
is logically impossible legally to punish the innocent.
That defense of the deterrence doctrine is either a
play on words or a study in grim humor.
Van den Haag appears too concerned with "law
and order" to be bothered at length with this ethical objection. Some of his statements about order
may traumatize the tender-minded. For example, he states (p. 40) that "[o]rder necessitates a
punishment far above what justice would countenance." That pronouncement is abstract to the point
of being harmless, but van den Haag does get to the
concrete in alleging that no more than one percent
of all offenders go to jail. One may question that figure, but it is probably not far off; as such it is a
nasty reminder of the state of the criminal justice
system. Van den Haag attributes the situation in
large part to lenient judges, plea bargaining, and
exclusionary rules of evidence. The character of
his argument is reflected in two sentences (pp.
175-76): "The simplest, least costly, and most
effective way to reduce the crime rate is to assure a
8
E.g., Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the
Death Penalty 284 ANNALS 55 (1952).
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speedy and reasonable trial for suspects. A trial to
determine not the provenience of the evidence or
the admissibility of testimony but the defendant's
guilt or innocence." Surely one must wonder how
reaching a verdict in a criminal trial can be divorced
from the provenience of evidence or the admissibility of certain kinds of testimony.
The unresolved paradox. Penal policy may be
influenced by forcible arguments more than by
demonstrations of empirical uniformities. Yet van
den Haag's general prescriptions for penal policy are
not compatible, primarily because he tries to justify
legal punishments on the two different grounds of
retribution and deterrence. In defending the assertion that punishments deter, van den Haag states
(p. 65): "the overwhelming majority of people are
deterrable in most situations most of the time."
That statement is one of numerous instances where
he hurls an empirical generalization at the reader
without offering specific evidence. The alternative
is a sophisticated theory, one that stipulates the
conditions in which the threat of punishment will
deter.
As indicated earlier, van den Haag does not call for
a theory of deterrence; perhaps it is just as well. If a
truly sophisticated and ostensibly valid deterrence
theory is ever formulated, it will pose a dilemma for
Anglo-American legislators and van den Haag. There
is every reason to suppose that the theory will be a
study in the stipulation of contingencies, of assertions
that the deterrent efficacy of punishment is relative to
certain conditions. There is also every reason to
suppose that some of those conditions will pertain to
the social characteristics of prospective offenders
(e.g., age, social class); but imagine an Anglo-American legislator advocating more severe statutory
penalties for unskilled workers and individuals with
an annual income of less than $10,000. Criminal law
cannot be consistent with a sophisticated deterrence
theory without becoming exceedingly complicated.
In addition, the real or pretended commitment of
Anglo-American legislators to the principles of democracy virtually precludes markedly contingent
statutory penalties. Demonstration of the contingent character of deterrence would pose no less a dilemma for van den Haag, because he is committed to
the principle (p. 47) "that the law differentiate
among offenders only in terms of their offenses."
The principle may well be consistent with the retribution doctrine; but it is scarcely a basis for promoting deterrence. In aspiring to justify both retribution and deterrence, van den Haag has taken on
more than he, or anyone else, can handle.
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DELINQUENCv:

DIMENSIONS OF DEVI-

Edited by Marc Riedel and Terence P.
Thornberry. New York: Prager Publishers,
1974. Pp. 175. $16.50.
A N C E.

Crime and Delinquency: Dimensions of Devi-

once, by Riedel and Thornberry, is an edited collection of readings selected from the 1973 meetings of
the American Society of Criminology. The organizational theme of the work is established in the
lead article by Charles Reasons, "Paradigm Conflict
in Criminology." Reasons points out that in the
attempt to understand crime, criminologists have
tended to focus either on the characteristics of the
offender, the social conditions that produce the
criminal or the political structure within which
crimes occur. Criminological investigations, therefore, may be categorized into "kinds of people,"
"kinds of environment," and "power/conflict" approaches. Using such a scheme, Riedel and Thornberry have compiled a series of fifteen articles from
the New York conference.
The use of edited collections for the presentation of
original papers delivered at professional meetings is a
valuable approach to the dissemination of information. Careful, thematic selections of such papers can
provide important source material for the criminologist. The Riedel and Thornberry reader, in addition
to contributing a positive example of this alternative
approach to the diffusion of scholarly works, contains
a number of original pieces that in themselves make
the reader a valuable collection. Krohn's empirical
investigation of differential association in the case of
marijuana use, Fishman's discussion of Arab terrorism, Farrell and Hardin's exploration of the effects
of arrest on homosexual career deviance, Abbott and
Calonico's study of the role of the press in the
maintenance of the myth concerning rape and race,
and Steadman And Braff's analysis of the use of
incompetency determinations in the adjudication
process are provocative, timely works which deserve
the careful attention of the criminologist.
VICTORIA L. SWIGERT

College of the Holy Cross

DEVIANCE: STUDIES IN DEFINITION, MANAGEMENT,
TREATMENT (2d ed.). By Simon Dinitz,
Russel R. Dynes, and Alfred C. Clarke. New
AND

York: Oxford University Press, 1975. Pp. xiv,
641. $7.95.
The second edition of Deviance contains five
major sections (The Concept of Deviation; Criminal Deviation; Willing Victims and Victimless
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Acts, Innovations in M~anagement; Control and
Treatment), eighteen subsections and a total of
sixty-five articles. Each major section is preceded
by a few pages of introduction by Dinitz et al. Each
subsection is concluded by "questions for discussion" and selected bibliographic materials. Three
Appendices (Glossary of Legal Phrases and Definitions; Classification of Mental Disorders; Classification of White Collar Crimes) are amended to
the collection. There is no index.
"Studies in Definition, Management and Treatment" is a new subtitle for the second edition and
reflects the broader focus of this version. Approximately eighty per cent of the articles are new,
including all of those in the fifth section (about
one-third of the book). As used in this work the term
management is best thought of as control. Many
more articles in this last section relate to the way in
which society controls deviance rather than the way
in which deviants "manage" their deviance. Articles here run the gamut from behavior modification
to diversion, defensible space to total institutions.
The first section of the book is an introductory
essay by the editors which offers the student alternate
definitions and conceptions of deviance. While it is
well written and generally a good piece, its brevity
tends to defeat its own purpose. For instance, on
page ten we find the statement that ".... the elements of personal control and choice are seen as the
determining factor in the 'setting apart' and for the
apparent minority status," while on page eleven in
a typology of deviance, "the freak" (i.e., midget,
dwarf, ugly, fat, etc.) is presented as a deviant type.
Even though the presentation of freaks as deviant
contradicts the statement on page ten, both modes
of definition are legitimate. The problem is that the
authors do not spend enough time indicating to the
student how both definitions can exist simultaneously.
The articles that have been chosen and edited will
make interesting reading for most students. They are
mainly of recent origin and cover the major traditional areas of deviance as well as contemporary attempts
at control. It should be noted that footnotes and
citations found in the original articles have been deleted from these reprints. Students should have the
opportunity to see the original citations and footnotes because they serve to illustrate both good and
shoddy scholarship. Students learn from such examples; further, the inclusion of citations aids them
in finding other articles for the purpose of researching papers. While the bibliographies provided at
the end of subsections offset this problem to some

extent, they are "selected" and do not adequately
replace the original references.
Students will find the three appendices most useful
as an aid to understanding terms used in the articles.
"Legal Phrases and Definitions" is based on pre1974 Ohio law. Some of the legal terms will vary in
different jurisdictions; however, this should not
provide much of a problem, as definitions of major
crimes overlap a good deal. There is one peculiar
omission from the legal terms-various forms of
homicide are included (manslaughter, feticide, fratricide, infanticide, matricide, patricide, suicide,
uxoricide), but there is no mention of murder.
In sum, the selection of readings is excellent for
use in courses which introduce students to the
sociology of deviance. There is a sufficiently broad
selection of readings so that instructors who take a
traditional approach to deviance will have no trouble
finding articles to illustrate lecture material. Future
editions however, should include an expanded introduction, original citations and footnotes, and an
irtdex.
ROBERT A. SILVERMAN

The University of Alberta

CRIMINOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CRIME

By Richard Quinney. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1975. Pp. 370. $11.95.
The purposes of a textbook are manyfold. It
should provide information, a frame of reference for
the student, a point of departure for lectures, and a
spur to the development of intelligent and independent thinking by a knowledgable citizenry.
Quinney attempts to fulfill all of these functions by
moving back and forth between conventional wisdom
about crime and the new conceptions that negate
traditional ideas.
As a textbook, Criminology covers the full range of
subjects generally covered in introductory courses:
history of criminology; statistics; patterns of criminal
behavior, including conventional white collar and
organized crime; police; courts; and corrections. In
this sense it provides information and a point of
departure for lectures. In addition, exceptionally
provocative sections on criminal law, crimes by the
State in American society, and social reactions to
crime are included; all of which are permeated by
Quinney's critical theory and dialectical thinking.
Herein lies the challenge to thinking.
It is disappointing, but not unexpected, to find the
book's strength in subject matter previously covered
by the author's other work. The theme, so perIN AMERICA.
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suasively argued, is that the criminal law and the
administration of justice is a political power-play by
those in a position to impose their values, norms, and
vested interest through the processes of government.
This can provide the naive student with an alternative perspective on the social reality of crime and a
much needed prodding out of his apathy. Quinney's
discussion of the political order laws from 17761970 and the history of property crimes offers sobering insights which challenge the bicentennial
propaganda permeating American society today.
His discussion of constitutional abridgements
which have come to light during the Watergate investigations should be part of every student's information system.
The weakness of the text occurs when the author
attempts to apply his assertions about the development of criminal law and social control to the
sociology of the criminal act. All systems have power
structures; this is a truism, and few question the
belief that some of the behavior which is defined as
criminal in America reflects capitalist vested interests.
On the other hand, there does exist behavior which
would be defined as criminal irrespective of economic
system. The causes lie in social processes not
necessarily related to the means of production. The
critical theory thus seems to break down when these
forms of behavior are discussed.
The chapters dealing with behavioral types fall
appallingly short in information, read as cursory
exercises, and leave the reader with a sense of
superficiality. There is an insufficient discussion of
the learning process, containment, or attachments.
Too little attention is given to the different levels of
analysis or the linkage between them, particularly in
terms of how the system itself tends to isolate,
alienate, or create structural determinants of survival
by class. There is, in essence, no integration of the
dialectical theoretical perspective with the etiology of
criminal behavior. The thesis that most crime consists of both exploiting others and surviving within
the system (p. 131) is reserved for business crime and
is not applied in the short chapter on conventional
criminality. The text underanalyzes the effects of
urban, industrial, affluent, capitalist conditions on
the age, sex, class, and racial factors in criminal
involvement.
The objective of "negating the established order"
(p. 13) is a valuable pedagogical tool and a major
contribution to criminological thinking; but, at
times, this objective leads to the drawing of conclusions contradictory to cited evidence and thereby
weakens the argument. For example, criminologists
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are chided for being ancillary agents of political
power (p. 13); yet the bulk of cited data (Presidential
commission findings, advisory commission suggestions, and empirical evidence) which support the
notion of biased, discriminatory, and unequal administration of justice come from these same accused
criminologists. Likewise, a systematic discussion of
FDA regulations against food and drug manufacturers is followed by the conclusion that the agency is
more closely tied to industry interests than general
public interest (p. 76). In other instances words,
such as "of course" and "naturally," are interjected
into conclusions. The impression left is that the
method employed in the critical approach is to
cite a bias and affirm it at all costs rather than the
traditional scientific method of citing a bias and
trying to disprove it.

Overall, and despite its weakness in the middle,
Criminology is a refreshing classroom tool. It is
capable of communicating in a readable way an
alternative perspective, of presenting a challenge to
the passive, non-thinking student, and of offering a
reasonably well documented source for the cynical
liberal or the skeptical conservative criminologist. As
a textbook it is more than a regurgitation of other
works; it is truly an "analysis and critique of crime
in America."
PAUL C. FRIDAY

Western Michigan University

SOCIETY. Edited by Robert A.
Silverman and James J. Teevan, Jr. Toronto:

CRIME IN CANADIAN

Butterworth and Company, Ltd., 1975. Pp. x,
455.
The study and teaching of criminology in Canada
has long suffered from a shortage of teaching materials devoted primarily to the Canadian experience
with crime. Crime in Canadian Society is an at-

tempt by two Canadian sociologists to rectify that
problem. It is, in effect, an anthology of selected
readings which serves to introduce the beginning
student to the study of crime with particular reference to the Canadian situation.
The authors divide the subject matter into four
areas in order to provide the student with a broad
view of the fundamental issues in the study of crime.
These four sections are entitled: The Definition of
Crime, Measuring Crime and Delinquency, Theories of Crime and Delinquency, and a concluding
section called simply Selected Research in Canadian
Criminology. Each section is preceded by a few
pages of comments from the authors setting out the
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purpose of the section, the principle issues raised
and discussed therein, and the general content of
each of the papers contained in the section. A final
chapter of the book contains a glossary of terms, certain statistical data, and a bibliography.
Of the twenty-two essays that provide the principle content of this book, only one was prepared especially for Crime in Canadian Society. This fact
reflects the embryonic state of the discipline in Canada. Canadian criminology is still at the accumulation and identification stage of development, although it is likely that in the near future Canadian
scholars will more often be linked with particular
methods and theories.
Despite this obvious handicap to any general Canadian work in this field, the authors of Crime in
Canadian Society have succeeded admirably in acquainting the new student with the history of the
discipline, the schools of criminology, the statistical
quagmire, and the other factors considered essential
to a fundamental grasp of the field. At the same time
they have retained an appropriately Canadian perspective. They should especially be commended for
selecting materials which tempt the student to develop an interest in contentious areas, and for bringing together in one volume the finest collection of
indigenous Canadian research in the field of crime.
The only serious weakness of Crime in Canadian
Society is its extremely sociological approach to
the crime problem. This is perhaps excusable in
light of its intended use in introductory sociology
courses; but the obligation to foster an interdisciplinary approach to what is surely a multifaceted problem must begin at introductory level
courses in criminology. Crime in Canadian Society does not do a good job of alerting students to
the contributions made to the study of crime by
theories in the fields of political science, economics,
and law. This is dangerous precedent, indeed, and
is likely substantially to affect the beginning student's perception both of the area and of her or his
potential contribution to the field. The questionable wisdom of this insularity is indicated in the
opening remarks to the first chapter when the authors present oversimplified and misleading, if
not altogether inaccurate, statements respecting
Canadian criminal law.
This single error of orientation is not, however,
sufficient to detract from the overall high quality of
Crime in Canadian Society. The authors should be
congratulated for attempting to piece together a
representative Canadian work in this field and for
carrying out that purpose in an obviously thought-

ful and professional manner. The book is certain to
prove extremely valuable both to students in introductory courses and to other persons interested in
developing a working knowledge of Canada's approach, both in theory and practice, to prohibited
deviance.
JIM ORTEGO

Dalhousie University Law School
Halifax, Nova Scotia

By
Hon. Marvin E. Frankel. New York: Hill and
Wang, 1973. Pp. x, 124. $5.95.
This small but stimulating volume takes as its
theme a contradiction: that our "nation of laws"
operates without laws sufficient to guide sentencing.
In brief, Frankel's argument is that sentencing is so
individualized, and judges are so independent, that
the sentencing process is relatively lawless. Frankel's
purposes are to describe the problems and suggest
solutions. The basis of these discussions is best
described as "participant observation," for Frankel
is a federal court judge with many years of experience on the bench.
The problem with sentencing, Frankel argues, is
not with the law, but with the absence of law. As an
example, Frankel discusses the presentencing process. To the point of conviction, the defendant's
interests are protected through the privilege against
self-incrimination. However, following conviction,
during the presentence investigation, this legal safeguard disappears. The result is a double bind: "If
the defendant tells all, he may eviscerate his pending
appeal. . . . If he insists on protesting his
innocence, he is likely to be tagged for lacking
.remorse or repentance. . . . " (p. 27).
Characteristically, Frankel does not suggest that we
abandon the presentence investigation, but instead
that the results be disclosed and subjected to dispute
by defense counsel, and that extraneous and prejudicial information be eliminated.
Frankel goes on to consider various sentencing
reforms. Noting again that "[the problem has been
too little law, not too much" (p. 58), Frankel argues
that sentencing seminars and institutes alone cannot solve our problems. A more important contribution would involve an expanded review of sentencing
decisions in the appeals courts. Frankel's point- is
that one of the best ways of injecting more order into
the sentencing process would be to allow the appeals
courts to "make" law in this area in the same way
they have in many others. As American courts curCRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER.
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rently function, access to appeal on sentencing is
severely restricted.
Perhaps the most interesting aspec t of Frankel's
discussion is the injection of new lif
feinto the old
suggestion that a simple but explici it calculus for
sentencing be developed. Frankel's sugggestion is that
such a calculus would allow (1) judges to weight
systematically the factors they consider *in sentencing,
(2) lawyers and probation officers to q uestion specifically the particular weightings assi 8gned, and (3)
appeals courts to reconstruct accuraately, and recreate constructively, the weightings that were and
will be applied. Although Frankel do es not mention
it, it can be noted that the recent use of multivariate
techniques by social scientists in sente ncing research
provides an appropriate framework within which
such a calculus can be developed. Frankel does
suggest that such a calculus be appli ed experimentally, evaluated and, if found successfu 1, enacted by a
special commission empowered to deallwith sentencing.
In essence, the jurist Frankel has reached many
of the same conclusions through his paarticipation in,
and observation of, court work that s ocial scientists
have recently reached through theiir own more
cumbersome statistical procedures. Th e suggestion is
not that one of these techniques is pr eferable to the
other, but rather that if the two are a greed, as they
are in many ways, we may now hay'e grounds for
joint action. The encouraging prospect is that we are
reaching the point where social scientiific techniques
can be applied to help bring the orderliness to
sentencing that Frankel and others currently find
lacking.
JOHN HAGAN

University of Toronto.

LICENCE: A STUDY OF PAROLE
By Pauline
Mors and Farida Beverly. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1975. Pp. x, 178, $17.50.

ON

PRISON WITHOUT WALLS: REPORT 0 N NEW YORK

By Citizens' Inquiry 07* Parole and
Criminal Justice, Inc. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. Pp. xxii, 210. $16.50.
In the midst of the present con troversy over
parole utility and effectiveness these wo books are
both helpful, though for different reasons. On
Licence: A Study of Parole is a conventional
research study of parole in Britai n. Its major
strengths lie in the authors' coordina tion of theory
and research on the topics of opportu nity structure,
criminal typologies, prisonization, self-concept,
labeling theory, and parole outcome. 1 his book will
PAROLE.
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prove particularly useful to professionals interested
in these topics. Those interested in the detailed
development of the infant British parole system will
also find this book engrossing.
The major research weakness lies in the small size
of the sample used in the study. Fifty parolees were
interviewed from a closed training prison and another fifty from an open prison. Research findings
were analyzed and discussed in a logical and
coherent manner in relation to six offender categories. Where discrepancies occured in the data, they
were discussed and usually given adequate explanation.
The study is useful to students and practitioners
for its through discussion of the constraints of
conducting criminological research in a correctional
setting. Choice passages include those dealing with
the "role of the research worker in the penal setting"
and the methodological problems of interviewing and
testing a "relatively inarticulate and culturally
deprived population." From her own experience this
reviewer also finds the authors' discussion of re-entry
problems and problems of supervision to be both
accurate and effectively described.
The authors conclude that their findings cast
doubt upon the treatment value of parole supervision
because of its "irrelevance" to the parolees' situation
and its superficiality. However, they feel that one of
the most beneficial aspects of the parole process is the
early release from prison which it provides. In spite
of the small sample size, the findings are consistent
with related literature. It is ironic that these British
authors finally argue for extension to broader risk
groupings of the infant British parole system, while
at the same time some American observers are
suggesting abolition of the older and more inclusive
American parole process when both groups have
concluded that parole is irrelevant.
Prison Without Walls is one such book recommending parole abolition. The book is the report of
the Citizens' Inquiry on Parole and Criminal
Justice, a group formed as a private, nonprofit
research corporation in the wake of the uprising at
Attica in 197 1. David Rudenstine served as Chairman
and Director of the group and Ramsey Clark
authored the foreword. The major strength of this
book is its discussion of the discrepancies between
parole theory and practice. Particularly thorough
treatments are given of recent court decisions regarding the processes of granting and revoking parole,
and of literature regarding the effectiveness of treatment programs. A major weakness was the inclusion
of interviews with parolees referred by private, voluntary agencies who were paid five dollars each for
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their comments on the New York parole system.
Conclusions based upon these interviews are questionable due to possible bias resulting from the selection process.
The major conclusion of the book is that parole
"tries to do an impossible job and cannot succeed."
The commission suggests instead a series of longrange recommendations designed to remove all
aspects of corrections which rest on rehabilitation
theory, including parole. Numerous substitutes are
offered. Recognizing the need for a "lengthy" period
of transition for these long-term recommendations to
occur, the commission further suggests a series of
short-term recommendations designed to minimize
the most unfair and destructive aspects of the parole
decision-making and supervision processes. The
entire series of recommendations should be considered seriously by all.
One major reservation held by this reviewer
involves the recommendation regarding the provision
of social services. One of the greatest problems which
probation/parole officers face is the lack of social
service facilities oriented to the needs of the offender.
However, the report's simple recommendation for
removing the parole function and substituting community service advisors does nothing to facilitate
provision of badly needed social services.
For all those who are trying to sort out their own
positions following the flurry of debate over the
Martinson Report, the Attorney General's policy
statement regarding parole, the ACA rebuttal and
the decision to abolish parole in Maine, this report
offers timely and informative reading.
MARILYN C. SLIVKA

Adult Probation Department
Court of Common Pleas
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

TERROR IN THE PRISONS: HOMIOSEXUAL RAPE AND
WHY

SOCIETY

CONDONES

IT.

By Carl Weiss

and David James Friar.Indianapolis/New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1975. Pp. xvi, 247. $8.95.
"More men than women are raped every year in
America. They are raped in prison." "Most prison
authorities have no intention of stopping it." "Can
anyone deny that sexual terror is the policy of the
American prisons?" With statements such as these,
this book gives ammunition to reformers. However,
many who are close to the prison scene will find the
portrait unrealistic.
On the basis of written sources and a few interviews with officials and former prisoners of the New
York State system, Terror in the Prisons claims that

"massive rape" is occurring in the nation's prisons
andjails. According to the authors, ten million of the
forty-six million Americans who will be arrested in
their lifetime will be raped in jail or prison.
The tragic and shocking subject discussed in this
book demands public attention. Fear of rape is a
dominant concern for some inmates. Others, both
aggressors and targets, become involved in damaging
violent encounters. However, the authors have no
basis for claiming that the rate of rape represented in
this book prevails throughout the country. Researching sexual aggression in the New York State system,
one is impressed by the relative absence of rape
victims among inmates randomly interviewed. As an
inmate in the Lewisburg Penitentiary, this reviewer
learned of only one or two rapes occurring there in
roughly a year. The authors claim both Lewisburg
and the New York State system have a high incidence
of homosexual assault. If research and observation
disprove such assumptions in these prisons, how can
the reader believe that similar inferences apply
elsewhere?
Without interviewing a single prison rape victim,
Weiss and Friar describe psychological effects of the
experience. They see "mental deterioration" and
suicide following from the event. Sexual identity is
considered to be permanently damaged. Victims are
described leaving prison embittered, ready to commit
vicious crimes to take out vengence on the society that
has treated them so cruelly. The authors' portrait of
these victims, claimed by them to represent twentyfive percent of.released prisoners, may be a damaging
myth and a disservice to convict re-integration.
Terror in the Prisons indiscriminately presents
opposing theories of sexual aggression existing in
prison literature to explain prison rape. On the one
hand, the authors claim non-sexual motives are at
work here. Lower-class men seek to validate their
masculinity by demonstrations of physical power;
blacks choose white victims because blacks' hate
whites. On the other hand, the authors see prison
rape as behavior stemming from sexual deprivation
which could be relieved by conjugal visits. Weiss
and Friar fall into this contradiction because they
simultaneously rely on differing criminological
notions of causation. Moreover, the theories are
themselves hypotheses which have never been
evaluated by systematic empirical observation in
institutions.
According to Weiss and Friar, prison and jail
employees tolerate, support, and even participate in
homosexual rape throughout the country. A few
examples are presented to support this view. The
extrapolation from these examples is unfounded,
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based more on zeal for change than on logic. Terror
in the Prisons is really a plea for criminal justice
reform carried by a sensationalized account of prison
rape. Accounts of sexual brutality mayjolt apathetic
citizens into supporting change; however, the purpose is accomplished by sacrificing insights into the
reality of prison life.
DANIEL LOCKWOOD
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increase the risk of apprehension and eventual
punishment.
Gibbs attempts to specify more clearly the notions
of deterrence by presenting sixteen conditions which
he identifies as types of deterrence. These conditions
all involve the behaviors of specific individuals. All
make use of restrictive, absolute, or specific deterrence in their descriptions. None of them deal with
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deterrence on a societal level. Thus, none of them

CRIME, PUNISHMENT,

involve what is usually referred to as general deterrence or general prevention. This typology of deterrence appears to be the keystone in Gibbs' theoretical framework. It exhibits greater complexity and

AND DETERRENCE.

Edited by

Jack P. Gibbs. New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., Inc., 1975. Pp. 259. $12.95.
Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence offers con-

vincing evidence that the study of deterrence is a
viable subject for both theoretical and empirical
investigation. The avowed purpose of the book is to
restate the doctrine of deterrence, with a view
towards creating a systematic theory or set of
theories. Gibbs notes that this is a difficult task when
the object of the theory is a physically unobservable
phenomenon.
An intriguing approach is taken in this book in an
attempt to overcome some of the limitations posed by
the above problem. Suggesting a departure from the
utilization of official crime indices as indicators of the
deterrent effectiveness of punishments, Gibbs calls
instead for the creation of special crime indices.
These "unconventional crime indices" are designed
to elicit specific types of information; they take six
different forms. An example of one of the unconventional indices is the index for residential crime rates
(Cr/Rt). "Cr is the total number of crimes committed
within the unit by residents .

.

. and Rt is the

total number of individuals who resided in the unit at
any time in the period."
In a re-analysis of some of the issues of deterrence, Gibbs alters some of the conventional terminology employed by other theorists to describe the
concepts of deterrence. Rather than utilizing the
conventional labels of specific and general deterrence,
he subdivides general deterrence into absolute and
restrictive deterrence. Absolute deterrence refers to
instances in which an individual has refrained from
engaging in criminal behavior throughout his life
because of the perceptions of risk of punishment

which he envisions. Restrictive deterrence, a concept
which Gibbs recognizes to be less than unique as it
corresponds to the channeling effect described by
Morris and Zimring,' involves a belief that some
criminal individuals will curtail their illegal activities
because the repetition of criminal behavior is apt to

sophistication than that found in much of the
previous theoretical work. It remains now for future

theorists to expand upon the ideas presented in this
work in order to apply them to the problems of deterrence on the broader societal level.
Gibbs' new book is a noteworthy contribution to
the field of deterrence. It is a creative attempt to
bring systematic development to a discipline which
has long been characterized by conflict and dissension. It clearly marks the path which we must follow
if we are to define and test theories of deterrence.
1 Morris
ANNALS

& Zimring, Deterrence and Corrections, 381

140 (1969).

CAROL TRILLING
State University of New York at Albany
POLICE CORRUPTION:

A

SOCIOLOGICAL

PERSPEC-

Edited by Lawrence W1'Sherman. New
York: Anchor Press, 1974. Pp. 347. $2.95.
During the last decade increased emphasis has
been placed on the manner in which criminal law is
TIVE.

formulated and administered by what many consider
to be an ineffective and inefficient criminal justice
system. No longer do we subscribe to the naive view

of the "forces of right," as represented by the agents
of control, against the "forces of evil," as represented
by the criminal element in society. We are far too
aware of the abuse of power and the extensive corruption that pervades the system. In this regard
Sherman has performed a useful service by bringing
together in one volume fifteen essays that deal with

one element of this corruption; that is, those illegal
practices engaged in by the police.
Sherman, in an introductory essay, attempts to
develop a theory of police corruption that can deal

with the historical and modern forms of police
corruption. Focusing on those police bribery practices that serve personal rather than organizational
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interests, Sherman develops a typology of corrupt
police departments according to the pervasiveness of
the corruption, its organization, and the source of the
bribes. After briefly outlining three major forms of
corrupt police departments, Sherman next considers
several constant and variable factors that make police
corruption possible or likely. The latter factors are
designated as propositions that relate to the contingencies affecting police work and include the community, the law, and the organizational and control
elements associated with police departments. While
effects of these elements have been examined at
length by many authors, Sherman's attempt to
combine them into a conceptual framework for understanding the existence and persistence of police
corruption is a worthy contribution to the growing
body of literature on the role and function of police
in modern societies.
In addition to his introductory essay, Sherman has
brought together essays and articles dealing with the
issue of police corruption in the United States,
Europe and India. The articles include the early,
but classic, analysis of police and gambling by
William J. Whyte, as well as the more recent
analysis of police and narcotics by the Knapp
Commission in New York. Sherman's inclusion of
Rubenstein's analysis of the day to day interactions of
the police in a large city is also a welcome and useful
aid for understanding the role of the police. Also
included is an interesting case study by Stoddard of
how group processes in a police department helped
to maintain an informal code of illegal activities.
In addition, Sherman has included several essays
dealing with the history of police corruption prior
to 1900, along with the expected policy recommendations to control police corruption. However, before we can expect police departments to control
their own corruption, it is important to consider
whether the police can adequately control the level
of crime in any of the large urban areas, as well as
the effect of the admitted failures in this endeavor
on police morale and corruption.
ALBERT P. CARDARELLI
Boston University

pointed out that many of his dissents subsequently
became the law. The Price of Perfect Justice by
Judge Macklin Fleming of the California Court of
Appeals is, in its way, a "great dissent" from the
unrealities and inanities of the current criminal
justice system; one can only hope that his dissenting opinions will someday become law as well.
Calmly, lucidly, but with devastating impact,
Judge Fleming charges that an elitist group of
"dominant legal theorists" has embarked on a quest
for procedural perfection, insofar as the criminal
accused is concerned. But, he notes, this search for
procedural legal perfection has created a situation
whereby as long as five months may be spent in
jury selection; the same murder charge tried five
different times; the same issues of search and seizure reviewed over and over again; and accusations
may be routinely sidestepped by the accused who
makes the legal machinery the target instead of
his own conduct. To Judge Fleming this is an unhealthy state of affairs:
The perfectionists argue [that] no sacrifice is too great
to assure that in a given case perfect justice will be
done. Ignored is the sacrifice of the legal order itself
and the life, liberty of those that the legal order is
designated to protect.

These terse comments from the first chapter
sum up the basic premise of the book. In the
subsequent chapters, the author develops his thesis so
meticulously and compellingly that it is difficult to
conceive that anyone-liberal or conservative, civillibertarian or "hard-liner"-could remain unconvinced.
Judge Fleming begins with the criticism that the
procedural perfectionists require that all court decisions of constitutional dimension be made totally
retroactive; he graphically illustrates the resultant
chaos. For example, he notes that a 1932 auto theft
conviction in Nebraska (of a defendant adjudged in
1957 in California to be a habitual criminal) was
held to be reviewable in 1963 because of the retrospective application of Gideon v. Wainright, in
which the Supreme Court of the United States held
that indigent defendants were entitled to free legal
counsel.
THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTICE. By Hon. Macklin
The author next comments on the unlimited
Fleming. New York: Basic Books, 1975. Pp. 171. number of appeals and procedural motions which are
accorded to criminal defendants in the United States.
$10.00.
Those who have commented on the recent retire- He points out especially the chaotic state of affairs
ment of Justice William 0. Douglas have almost under federal habeas corpus provisions, which perinevitably characterized him as the "great dissenter" mit lower federal courts to sit as totally independent
of the Court and have, with equal inevitability, and unrestrained bodies of review of state court de-
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cisions. He notes that in the combination of state
and federal courts in California, multiple review
could present a criminal defendant with twenty-six
separate ways in which to attack a single issue of
search and seizure.
Judge Fleming also deals with other corrosive
issues in the criminal justice system including trial
delays, "sidetracking" (the technique of a defendant's attacking the entire criminal process before
his trial even begins), and "open switching" (attempts to derail a trial no matter what action is taken
by the presiding judge). The author makes a philosophical case against disabilities of the current
judicial process, such as the irrelevance of guilt, retreat from the written law, and judicial avant-gardism. He makes it persuasively.
This is a book of major importance. It should not
only be read, but also thoroughly studied, by the
policy makers in our criminal justice system.

FRANK G.

CARRINGTON

Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.

WHOSE LAW?

WHAT ORDER?

A

CONFLICT

AP-

Edited by William
J. Chambliss and Milton Mankoff. New York:
PROACH TO

CRIMINOLOGY.

John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Pp. xiv, 256. $6.95.
Of the several dozen readers on criminology that
have appeared on the market in the last several years,
Chambliss and Mankoff's is certainly an improvement over the scissor and paste commodities priced
from $7.95 and up. Chambliss and Mankoff make
their biases clear, something done all too infrequently
by social scientists. The introduction, written by
Chambliss, makes explicit the two competing strands
in criminological theorizing. These are the functional
perspective associated with Emile Durkheim and
the conflict perspective of the Marxists. Several
propositions are derived, some incorrectly, from the
two perspectives on the content and operation of law,
on the consequences of crime for society, and on the
etiology of crime. Chambliss argues that present
research supports the conflict perspective. Thus, the
articles in the book were selected to offer the merits
of this view.
It is one thing to appreciate Marx's sociology, but
quite another to undertake such an analysis. The
only selection that can be called Marxian is Kennedy's "Beyond Incrimination." Chambliss' "The
State and the Criminal Law" focuses upon the
changes in the relations of production and on the
developments in the class struggle, but the analysis
relies mainly on liberal categories. The remaining
articles, although interesting reading, also rely
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upon liberal categories, if not functional analysis,
including the well known paper by David Gordon on
"Class and the Economics of Crime."
The exciting introduction gives promise of a
Marxian analysis of crime which is not fulfilled in the
remainder of the book. The editors of the book failed
in this task, this reviewer concludes, because a "conflict theorist" remains in the liberal tradition, albeit critical of the functionalist perspective. It is not
enough to cite from Marx here and there. A scholar
is either a Marxist or he isn't.
PAUL TAKAGI

University of California at Berkeley
JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES,

Edited by FredericL. Faust and
Paul J. Brantingham. St. Paul: West Publishing
Company, 1974. Pp. xv, 600.
"Readers" are notoriously difficult to evaluate.
Faust and Brantingham's Juvenile Justice Philosophy, however, shows just how valuable a well-constructed collection of readings can be when the
audience to be reached is kept in mind. As the editors
put it, this volume is directed to "juvenile court
judges and probation counselors, attorneys, law
enforcement personnel, students and all others concerned with the system of juvenile justice in the
United States." The phrase, "all others" is too
broad, for the volume is specifically focused on the
legal aspects of juvenile justice, considered from a
historical perspective.
The volume begins with a review of the "intellectual revolution" which occurred in the late 19th
Century as positivistic criminology overcame the
laissez-faire approach of classical theory. The second
section proceeds to an examination, through a well
balanced selection of readings, of the increased public
concern about the treatment of children subjected to
the criminal law, the "perceived threat of city slumlife," and the impact of the feminist movement on the
linking of "child-saving" interests with the doctrine
of parens patriae. From this base, a third section
considers several statements drawn from the struggles throughout the era of the "socialized" juvenile
court. Part IV examines the long "history of the
constitutionalist" arguments against the "socialized"
approach, part V treats the "constitutionalist revision" moving from Gault to Winship and McKeiver
and including some excellent research background
material. The editors conclude by providing a reasonable interpretation and a projection of probable
trends.
This volume is a real contribution. It should, as
AND COMMENTS.
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the editors hope, serve as an excellent text in courses
dealing specifically with the legal philosophy of
juvenile justice in the United States, or as either a
textual or supplementary resource for courses treating the evolution of the juvenile court.

problems of law enforcement in each city. For
comparative purposes three Chiefs of Police in the
United States, from San Francisco, Berkeley, and
Oakland, were also interviewed.
For the serious student of police leadership problems this book is disappointing in that the consideraRICHARD A. BALL
tions raised by Grossman have already been dealt
West Virginia University
with at considerable length in the extant literature.
Indeed, the author's discussion of certain points is
POLICE COMMAND: DECISIONS AND DISCRETION. By
very shallow (e.g., centralization vs. decentralizaBrian A. Grossman. Niagara Falls: MacLean- tion), while several other important dimensions of
Hunter Press, 1975. Pp. ix, 154. $7.00.
the leadership problem (e.g., corruption) are not
In this slim volume the author describes and even mentioned. Moreover, given the paucity of solid
assesses the myriad political, organizational, and cross national research in this area, the author is
structural pressures and impediments impinging remiss in his rather superficial treatment of such
upon the police chief in the development and imple- structural arrangements as the Board of Police Commentation of policy in a democratic society. Specifi- missioners and Ombudsman as oversight mechacally, Grossman addresses such important consider- nisms and/or access points for citizen input.
ations as the development of police leadership, the
Despite such shortcomings the book is generally
police bureaucracy and its seeming resistance to well organized, the issues lucidly stated, and the
change, enforcement priorities, limits of effective author's style crisp and concise. This volume should
leadership, and suggestions for new organizational be particularly appealing to the lay reader unfamiliar
and leadership patterns. The author's observations with the problems of police command and might be
are based on data obtained over a two year period of appropriate as a supplemental text in a criminal
interviews with non-police personnel familiar with justice course in a liberal arts or social science
five Canadian cities (Vancouver, Edmonton, Regina, curriculum.
Winnipeg, and Toronto), and supplemented by
ROGER SCHAEFER
interviews with non-police personnel familiar with Texas Tech University

